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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
POWERS v. PLUMAS UNIFIED 
SCHOOL DISTRICT 
192 F.3D 1260 (9THCIR. 1999) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In a matter of first impression, the Ninth Circuit in Powers 
u. Plumas Unified School District l addresses whether a dog 
sniff of a person constitutes a search under the Fourth 
Amendment.2 Because the United States Supreme Court has 
yet to address this issue, there is a split among circuit courts.a 
The Fifth Circuit, contrary to the Seventh Circuit, holds that a 
dog sniff of a person constitutes a search.4 The Ninth Circuit 
agrees with the Fifth Circuit.s In Powers, the Ninth Circuit 
1 
Powers v. Plumas Unified School District, 192 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 1999). The ap-
peal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California was 
argued and submitted on December 8, 1998 before Circuit Judges Pregerson and Bru-
netti and District Judge Aiken. Judge Aiken was sitting in by designation. Judge 
Pregerson authored the opinion. Judge Brunetti filed a concurring opinion. 
2 The Fourth Amendment provides: "the right of the people to be secure in their 
persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated ... but upon 
probable cause ... and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
a 
See Powers, 192 F.3d at 1266. 
4 See id. 
S See id. 
207 
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found that a dog sniff of the plaintiff deprived him of his con-
stitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures.6 However, at the time of the search, guidelines re-
garding the use of dogs to sniff students in a school setting 
were not clearly established.7 Therefore, the unlawful conduct 
was not apparent in light of preexisting law.B The defendants, 
in their individual capacities, are entitled to qualified immu-
't 9 my. 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
B.C., the minor child of Cynthia Ann Powers, was a student 
at Quincy High School in Plumas County, California. lO On 
May 21, 1996, the Principal and Vice Principal instructed stu-
dents to exit their class. 11 As the students exited, they passed 
Deputy Sheriff Canalia and a drug sniffing dog, Keesha, sitting 
outside the class door.12 Keesha alerted the authorities to a 
student other than the plaintiff. 13 Subsequently, Keesha en-
tered the classroom sniffing students' backpacks, jackets and 
other belongings.14 When the students filed back into the class-
room, they passed the Deputy Sheriff and Keesha a second 
time. 15 Keesha again alerted to the same student.16 
6 See Powers, 192 F.3d at 1266. 
7 See id. at 1266. 
B See id. at 1268. Named defendants include the Plumas Unified School District 
Superintendent Joseph Hagwood, Principal Richard Spears, Vice Principal Arturo 
Barrera, Assistant Sheriff Rod Decrona, Deputy Sheriff Dean Canalia, and Detective 
Steven Hitch. See id. at 1262. 
9 
See Powers, 192 F.3d at 1268. 
10 See Powers v. Plumas Unified School District, 192 F.3d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir. 
1999). 
11 
See id. at 1263. 
12 See id. at 1263. 
13 See Powers, 192 F.3d at 1263. 
14 S id ee . 
15 See id. 
2
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The plaintiff, B.C., filed suit alleging deprivation of his 
Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches 
and seizures.17 Both plaintiff and defendants filed cross mo-
tions for summary judgment.18 The district court denied the 
plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction, class certification 
and summary judgment.19 Further, even though the district 
court determined that a dog sniff constituted an unreasonable 
search, all defendants were granted qualified immunity.20 B.C. 
appealed the district court's decision to the Ninth Circuit. 21 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed.22 
16 See id. This student was taken away and searched by school officials. No drugs 
were found on campus that day. See Powers, 192 F.3d at 1263. 
17 See id. at 1262. The Plaintiff also asserted a civil rights claim under California 
law and a claim for false imprisonment and spoliation of evidence. The plaintiff, B.C., 
sought injunctive relief, money damages, and certification of a plaintiff class. See id. at 
1263. 
18 See id. at 1263. 
19 See Powers, 192 F.3d at 1263. B.C. sought to eIijoin the school and sherirrs de-
partment from arbitrary sniff searches of himself and any other student in the Plumas 
Unified School District. See id. at 1262. The District Court dismissed B.C.'s claim as 
moot. In addition, the District Court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred B.C's 
claim for money damages against the school officials in their official capacity. See id. 
at 1263. The Court stated that a high school is not an entity capable of being sued. 
See id. at 1264. B.C. has not appealed this ruling. See Powers, 192 F.3d at 1264. Fur-
thermore, the district court dismissed the claim against the sherirrs department in 
their official capacity. See id. at 1264. B.C failed to demonstrate a causal link between 
an official policy or custom of the Sherirrs Department and his deprivation of constitu-
tional rights. See id. at 1264. The Sherirrs Department policy only permits dog sniffs 
of objects, not persons. Officers are trained in accordance with this policy. See id. at 
1264. B.C failed to provide evidence refuting the Department's policy. See Powers, 
192 F.3d at 1265. 20 See id. at 1263. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of all in-
dividual defendants because at the time of the incident the parameters for permissible 
dog searches were not clearly established. See id. at 1265. 21 See id. at 1263. 
22 See id. at 1263. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's grant of sum-
mary judgment of all defendant's on all claims. See Powers, 192 F.3d at 1263. How-
ever, the Ninth Circuit Court affirmed the dismissal of B.C.'s preliminary injunction 
on the alternate grounds that B.C. lacked standing. See id. The named plaintiff in a 
class must "demonstrate a real or immediate threat that defendants will again subject 
him to an illegal dog sniff of his person." See id. B.C does not attend, nor does he plan 
to attend, any school within the Plumas Unified School District; thus he is not repre-
sentative of the plaintiff class and he holds no standing to seek injunction relief. See 
3
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III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS 
To determine qualified immunity, the Ninth Circuit applied 
a two prong test.23 First, B.C. must show that the school's ac-
tion constitutes a deprivation of his Fourth Amendment right 
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.24 Then, 
B.C. must show that the right was clearly established at the 
time of the events in question.25 If the second prong is not 
proven then the defendants are entitled to qualified 
. 't 26 Immum y. 
"A search occurs when an expectation of privacy that society 
deems reasonable is infringed.,,27 Although the Supreme Court 
has found that a dog sniff of unattended luggage at an airport 
does not constitute a search, the Supreme Court has not ad-
dressed whether a dog sniff of a person constitutes a search.28 
The Ninth Circuit, however, has recognized that a dog sniff of 
a person increases the level of intrusiveness.29 The level of in-
id. at 1264. The Ninth Circuit also affirmed the dismissal of B.C's claim that defen-
dants subjected him to unreasonable seizure of person. See Powers, 192 F.3d at 1269. 
Students are required to be on school premises during the course of the school day. 
Requiring students to stand under a covered snack bar area for five minutes while the 
dog sniff of the classroom occurred is reasonable and not within the meaning of a 
Fourth Amendment seizure. See id. 
23 
See Powers v. Plumas Unified School District, 192 F.3d 1260,1265 (9th Cir. 
1999). 
24 
See id. 
25 
See id. 
26 
See id. 
27 See Powers, 192 F.3d at 1265 (citing United States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109, 113 
(1984». 
28 See Powers, 192 F.3d at 1265 (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 
(1983». 
29 
See Powers, 192 F.3d at 1266 (citing United States v. Beale, 736 F.2d 1289, 1291-
92 (1984». In Beale, the Ninth Circuit states that the sniffing of luggage carried by an 
individual causes virtually no annoyance and the dog rarely contacts the owner of the 
bag. See id. 
4
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trusiveness in the investigative technique is critical to deter-
mine whether the technique constitutes a search.3o . 
Upon reviewing precedent from other circuits, the Ninth 
Circuit noted that only the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have 
directly addressed whether a dog sniff of a student is a 
search.31 The Fifth Circuit, in Horton v. Goose Creek Independ-
ent School District,32 found that the ''intensive smelling of peo-
ple is indecent and demeaning."a3 Therefore, dog sniffing of a 
student is a search.34 In Horton, the school used dogs to sniff 
the students' automobiles and lockers.35 Furthermore, the dogs 
were taken into the classroom to sniff the students.3s Although 
the dog in Powers did not physically touch the students, the 
proximity of the physical intrusion did not concern the Ninth 
C· 't 37 lrcul . 
Conversely, and despite nearly identical facts to Horton, the 
Seventh Circuit, in Doe v. Renfrow,38 found that a dog sniff did 
30 
See Powers, 192 F.3d at 1266 (citing Beale, 736 F.2d at 1291-92). The holding in 
Beale is based on the Supreme Court decisions of United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 
(1983) and United States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109 (1984). See id. at 1266. 31 See Powers, 192 F.3d at 1266. 
32 
See Horton v. Goose Creek Independent School District, 690 F.2d 470, 479 (5th 
Cir.1982). 
33 See id. at 1266 (citing Horton, 690 F.2d at (79). The Ninth Circuit previously 
cited Horton in Beale. See id. at 1266. In Beale, the Ninth Circuit also cited a Michi-
gan Law review article that stated a dog sniff of a person is offensive and harrowing to 
the person in addition to citing Justice Bennan's dissent in Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 
91 (7th Cir. 1980), where he recognized dog sniff cases involved the smelling of inani-
mate and unattended objects. 
34 
See Powers, 192 F.3d at 1266. 
35 S 'd ee, . 
36 
See id. In Horton, one of the dogs, a Doberman Pinscher or German Shepherd, 
put its nose up against one or more of the students. See id. 
37 
See Powers, 192 F.3d at 1266 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 
(1967». "The reach of the Fourth amendment cannot turn on the presence or absence 
ofa physical intrusion." [d. at 1266. 
38 See Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980). 
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not constitute a search.39 The Seventh Circuit adopted the dis-
trict judge's opinion that the presence of the sniffing dog in the 
classroom, at the request of school officials, was not a search 
despite evidence that the dogs ran their noses along the pupil's 
legs and touched their bodies.40 
The Ninth Circuit agrees with the Fifth Circuit's decision 
that close proximity sniffs of the person by a canine or human 
are offensive.41 Therefore, a dog sniff infringes B.C.'s reason-
able expectation of privacy and constitutes a search. 42 
Constitutionality of a search is measured by the reason-
ableness of the search under the circumstances.43 To be rea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment, a search must be based 
upon individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. 44 In Powers, 
school officials admitted there was no individualized suspicion 
of wrongdoing by any student.45 However, under limited cir-
cumstances, a suspicionless search may be reasonable where 
the privacy interests implicated in the search are minimal and 
an important governmental interest will be jeopardized by the 
requirement of the individualized suspicion.46 
In Powers, the Ninth Circuit upholds the well-settled notion 
that students' privacy interests are maintained while in 
39 See Powers, 192 F.3d at 1266 (citing Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91, 92 (7th Cir. 
1980». 
40 
See id. at 1266. Four of the eight Seventh Circuit judges wrote separate dissents 
from the court's failure to rehear the case en banco See Doe v. Renfrow, 635 F.2d 582 
(7th Cir. 1980). 
41 
See Powers, 192 F.3d at 1266. 
42 See id. 
43 
See id. at 1267 (citing Vernonia School District v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 
(1995». 
44 
See id. at 1267 (citing Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313 (1997». 
45 
See Powers,192 F.3d at 1267. 
46 
See id. at 1267. A suspicionless urinalysis drug testing of student athletes was 
upheld in Vernonia due to the school's immediate drug crisis; however, in Vernonia, 
the court cautioned against the assumption that drug testing would readily pass con-
stitutional muster in other contexts. See id. 
6
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school. 47 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district 
court's finding that a dog sniff is highly intrusive.48 A dog sniff 
by itself often illicits irrational fear.49 Compounded with a 
sudden and unannounced search the dog sniff now takes on a 
distressing and intrusive character. 50 In addition, a dog sniff of 
the body intrudes upon the body and its odors which are highly 
personal. 51 Thus, the expectation interests of the students are 
not minimal.52 Further, the Ninth Circuit finds there was no 
indication of a drug crisis or drug problem at Quincy High 
School in May 1996.53 Although deterrence of drug use is an 
important, if not compelling, governmental interest, in the ab-
sence of evidence of a drug problem of crisis, the governmental 
interest at Quincy High School would not have been placed in 
jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion. 54 There-
fore, the Ninth Circuit concludes that the random and suspi-
cionless dog sniff search of B.C. was unreasonable in these cir-
55 
cumstances. 
Given that a search occurred, the court determines 
whether, at the time of the search, the government official 
should have known that his conduct violated a clearly estab-
lished constitutional right. 56 The contours of the right must be 
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand 
47 
Id at 1267. Students retain their constitutional rights, including an expectation 
of privacy, upon entering school grounds. See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969); Although students have a lesser 
expectation of privacy than members of the population at large, they still retain an 
expectation of privacy when entering school grounds. Vernonia at 657. See also New 
Jersey v. TLO, 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985). 
48 
See Powers, 192 F.3d at 1267. 
49 
See id. at 1267 (citing Horton, 690 F.2d at 483) . 
. 50 
See id. 
51 
See Powers, 192 F.3d at 1267 (citing Horton, 690 F.2d 483). 
52 
See id at 1268. 
53 
See id. 
54 
See id. 
55 
See Powers, 192 F.3d at 1268. 
56 
See id. at 1268. 
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that what he is doing violates that right.57 The plaintiff must 
establish that the unlawfulness of the conduct was "apparent 
in light of preexisting law," not necessarily that it was uncon-
stitutional. 58 Even if there is no case on point that specifically 
declares the right, if the right has been disputed, then the de-
fendants would be on notice and would not be eligible for a 
qualified immunity defense.59 In Powers, the Ninth Circuit 
finds that at the time in question, the use of dogs to sniff stu-
dents in a school setting was not clearly established.60 There-
fore, each defendant could have believed his conduct was law-
ful and each is entitled to the defense of qualified immunity.sl 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION 
Government and school officials can no longer claim quali-
fied immunity since precedent has now been set for dog sniff-
ing of students in schools. However, it seems questionable that 
the Fourth Amendment extends so far as to define a search as 
a "walk by" of nearly four feet between the student and the 
dog. Social encounters in schools, and society at large, take 
place within closer proximities yet this case claims such close 
proximity sniffing, whether by human or canine, is offensive. 
Judge Brunetti, in his concurring opinion, distinguishes 
Horton from Powers.62 In Horton, the dog directly touches the 
students while in Powers the dog is always three to four feet 
from the students.63 Such a distance is not taken into account 
by the majority. Brunetti further states that the majority fails 
to identify the reasonable expectation of privacy that was in-
57 
See id. at 1268 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987». 
58 
See id. at 1268 (citing Jensen 145 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 1997». 
59 
See Powers. 192 F.3d at 1268 (citing Blueford v. Prunty, 108 F.3d 251,254 (9th 
Cir. 1997» . 
. 60 
See id. at 1268. 
61 
See id. at 1268. 
62 See Powers v. Plumas Unified School District, 192 F.3d 1260, 1270 (9th Cir. 
1999). 
63 
See id. 
8
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fringed upon when B.C. walked past the drug dog.64 To deter-
mine whether there has been a search the majority alludes to 
the Beale test, which identifies the level of intrusiveness in the 
investigative technique. 65 The Beale test states that a dog sniff 
is not a search under the Fourth amendment if it discloses only 
the presence or absence of contraband and it ensures that the 
owner (of the property) is not subject to embarrassment and 
inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and more intrusive 
investigative methods.66 The plaintiff in Powers was not subject 
to embarrassment by walking three feet from a dog whose sniff 
would only disclose the presence of contraband. 
In addition, the idea of legitimate governmental iI\terests 
seems questionable. If the school district must wait until a 
known drug problem or crisis exists prior to protective and 
preemptive searches then the school district is· not maintaining 
its duty to keep a drug free school zone. A proper analysis 
should balance the intrusion on the individual's expectation of 
privacy with the promotion of legitimate governmental inter-
ests, such as a preemptive and protective drug search within a 
large enough proximity for the average student to avoid em-
barrassment. 
Marnee Milner" 
64 . See id. at 1269. 
65 
See note 30. 
66 
See Powers, 192 F.3d at 1269 (citing United States v. Beale, 736 F.2d 1289, 1291-
2 (9th Cir. 1984» . 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, J.D. Candidate, 2001. 
9
Milner: Criminal Procedure
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2000
